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Abstract
A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically
able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety lurk two funda-
mental alternatives. The aggrieved party may (i) “a!rm” the contract and seek money
damages or specific performance; or (ii) “disa!rm” the contract with the remedy of
rescission and restitution. This simple dichotomy of contract remedies applies broadly
in both common law and civil law practice. We show here that this remedial regime
allows parties to write simple contracts that induce first-best cooperative investments.
Keywords: breach remedies, incomplete contracts, cooperative investments.
JEL-Classification: K12, L22, J41, C70.
1 Introduction
The expansive contract literature concerning the e!ciency of alternative remedial regimes is
surprisingly inattentive to the remedy of “rescission and restitution.” Rescission and resti-
tution, like money damages and specific performance, is an ordinary remedy for breach of
contract. Yet, unlike damages and specific performance, rescission and restitution entails a
disa!rmation of the underlying contract. That is, a disappointed promisee can rescind the
contract and get back any benefits conveyed upon the promisor (i.e., restitution). Availing
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this option has long been part of the common law tradition. This option was also avail-
able under the Roman model law of aedilitian remedies, which significantly influenced many
civil law jurisdictions and the drafters of the Vienna Convention.1 The aedilitian remedies
were introduced by the curule aediles (the Roman market police) and allowed the victim
of non-conforming delivery to choose between ‘actio redhibitoria’ (rejection and restitution)
and ‘actio quanti minoris’ (acceptance and apportionment).2 Modern contract scholars,
including those in law and economics, have lost sight of this old and customary “distinction
between actions that were brought ‘on’ and ‘o’ the contract. The idea was that the injured
party either a!rmed the contract, by seeking damages for breach, or else disa!rmed it, by
attempting to unwind the exchange..." (Kull, 2006). While academics may have abandoned
this doctrinal distinction, rescission and restitution remains a viable alternative to damages
and specific enforcement in practice. It is often an attractive expedient to the cost of prov-
ing money damages or monitoring specific performance. Moreover, as we establish below,
the option to pursue rescission and restitution or expectation damages, enables parties to
write contracts that allow for e!cient investment in situations where contract theorists have
shown that expectation damages alone would induce no investment. This result, however, is
contingent on a model that doesn’t fully capture important features of the legal framework
within which parties typically contract. Our analysis highlights the importance of mod-
eling carefully details of the legal framework; these details are not just embellishments of
legal doctrine, they often meaningfully influence behavior and may allow parties to achieve
e!cient outcomes in various contracting environments.
The contracting environment we consider is one where a buyer and seller, both risk-
neutral, enter a contract for the future delivery of one unit of a good of specified quality
for a fixed price. Before delivering the good the seller makes an investment that is both
relationship-specific and cooperative, which is to say the investment has no value outside of
the relationship between the parties and it increases the buyer’s value (as opposed to a selfish
1See Basedow (2005).
2See e.g. Zimmermann (1996), pp. 311.
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investment that lowers the seller’s cost). An illustration may be useful. Take the transaction
at issue in Tennessee Carolina Transportation Inc. v. Strict Corp,3 wherein a common cargo
trucking company enters an agreement with a trailer manufacturer, Strict Corp., for 150 new
trailers at a contract price of $854,250.00. Imagine that before manufacturing begins, Strict
investigates the shipping business of the trucking company to determine the best trailer
design for that company, given the cargo it commonly hauls, the average distances traveled,
the road surfaces and weather conditions the company’s drivers typically face and so on.
For example, if the trucking company tends to ship lighter freight, like shoes, then the
trailer frame may best be constructed using a less dense metal alloy or aluminum, which
would significantly economize on fuel usage over time. Dierent designs are optimal if the
company ships weightier freight, like major appliances, or if its shipping routes entail flat or
mountainous terrain or severe weather, such as snow or ice or extreme desert heat. Strict’s
investment in understanding the trucking company’s business is relationship-specific in that
the information it acquires cannot be fully deployed in the design of trailers for other clients,
who ship dierent products over other routes. Moreover, as Strict’s investment will lower
the average costs of the trucking company’s operations it is also cooperative.
In the legal regime we envisage the promisee has a choice, in the case of nonperformance
or nonconforming performance, between a!rming the contract and seeking expectation dam-
ages or disa!rming the contract with the remedy of rescission and restitution. We will show
that, given this regime and the contracting environment described above, parties are able to
induce first-best cooperative investments by writing simple fixed-price contracts.4 Contrasts
this with the result by Che and Hausch in their seminal 1999 article, which made salient the
3196 S.E.2d 711, 1973.
4The real world relevance of settings where cooperative investments are important can hardly be under-
estimated. Take, e.g., a business software developer like Oracle whose products can be used across a variety
of dierent industries but need to be customized to the special needs of individual clients. In a first stage,
Oracle sends in a team of consultants which tries to understand the client’s business processes before starting
with the actual implementation of the software solution. It is clear that the investment Oracle makes in
order to understand the business processes of client A does not help it to better understand the business
processes of client B (hence the investment is relationship- specific). It is equally obvious that the more
eort Oracle exerts to understand the needs of its client, the lower (on average) will be its future operating
costs (hence the investment is cooperative).
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notion of cooperative investments.5 Assuming an informational framework that implicitly
allowed only for specific performance, Che and Hausch observed that contracts do no better
than no contract at all when investments are cooperative (irrelevance of contracting). Che
and Chung (1999) followed by considering an informational environment that allowed for
other forms of contract remedies and concluded that expectation damages, the common law
default remedy, induces zero cooperative investments. Stremitzer (2008b) further enriched
the assumed legal environment by accounting for warranties (expressed and implied) and
demonstrated that expectation damages induce positive cooperative investments and can
even achieve the first-best if the quality specification in the contract is set to the highest
technically feasible level–so-called Cadillac contracts.6 However, this is unattractive as a
positive theory of how people induce positive cooperative investments as we do not usually
observe Cadillac contracts in the real world. In this paper, we show that by including yet
another ordinary feature of law, namely the option to sue o-the contract, the first-best can
be achieved for any chosen quality levels.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the burgeoning literature
on how simple contracts in combination with common breach remedies of contract law can
help to induce e!cient investments. Section 3 describes our model. In Section 4, we work
out two benchmarks: the socially optimal level of investment and the investment level absent
institutional arrangements. Our main result is derived in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
It is well known that if relationship-specific investments are not adequately protected by a
contract the danger of hold-up will lead parties to invest less than the socially optimal level
(Williamson 1979, 1985; Grout, 1984; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1988).
5We borrow the term “cooperative investments” from Che and Hausch (1999). They were first studied
in an incomplete contract setting by MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and are also referred to as “cross
investments” (e.g. Guriev, 2003) or “investments with externalities” (e.g. Nöldeke and Schmidt, 1995).
Other articles that consider cooperative investments include e.g. Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Maskin
and Moore (1999), De Fraja (1999), Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999), Segal and Whinston (2002), and Roider
(2004).
6The term “Cadillace contract” was coined by Edlin (1996).
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A large literature has developed showing that a combination of simple contracts (specifying
little more than the good to be exchanged and the price to be paid) and standard breach
remedies can solve this hold-up problem. Yet, most of the literature, starting with the sem-
inal papers by Shavell (1980, 1984) and Rogerson (1984), has focused exclusively on selfish
investments where, for example, a seller invests in order to reduce her cost or a buyer invests
in order to increase his benefit from the procured good or service. In recent years, starting
with Che and Chung (1999), a small literature on cooperative investments has emerged.
Che and Chung (1999) show that, with costless renegotiation, a simple contract (i.e., one
that does not condition on investment) achieves the first best if the contract is governed by
a regime of ‘reliance damages’–a standard remedy of contract law under which the court
orders the breaching party (promisor) to reimburse the promisee’s reliance expenditures on
the contract, including its investment. But they also derive the troubling result that the
common law default remedy of expectation damages, wherein the court orders the promisor
to compensate the promisee by putting him in as good a position as if the contract had been
performed, does not induce any cooperative investments.
This result, however, is seemingly contradicted by Schweizer (2006), who shows that
a regime of “bilateral expectation damages” can achieve the first best. The dierence in
results stems from Schweizer’s assumption that a party can also claim damages if the coun-
terparty underinvested relative to the level specified in the contract, while Che and Chung
(1999) assume that the contract does not condition on investments. Stremitzer (2008b) re-
visits ‘expectation damages’ in the same framework as Che and Chung (1999) and shows
that their zero cooperative investments result follows from the implicit assumption that
the contract stays silent in terms of required quality. Yet, this assumption is unrealistic.
Even if the parties do not stipulate an explicit quality level in their contract (such as an
express warranty), the court will do it for them by default. For example, by requiring the
good to serve its ordinary purpose (implied warranty of merchantability) courts establish
a minimum quality threshold.7 Taking this feature of real world contracting into account,
7See Sections 2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The analysis of Che and Chung
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Stremitzer (2008b) shows that expectation damages will always induce positive levels of co-
operative investments. Indeed, it is possible to achieve the first best by writing so-called
Cadillac contracts which stipulate the highest possible quality as the required quality level
under the contract. Moreover, this result holds even if, because of non-verifiability of invest-
ments, both ‘expectation damages’ as proposed by Schweizer (2006) and ‘reliance damages’
as advocated by Che and Chung (1999) are not available.8 Cadillac contracts, however, are
seldom observed in practice, although examples may be found.9 In the above case, Tennessee
Carolina Transportation Inc. v. Strict Corp., Strict Corp. had not agreed with Tennessee
Carolina Transportation to build a truck whose technical specifications could not be met at
the current state of technology, and it is highly doubtful that such contracts would be found
in similar situations. This makes the result by Stremitzer (2008b) unappealing as a positive
theory of how parties induce first-best cooperative investments. Under the regime considered
in this paper, which is modelled closely to the more complex optional nature of real world
contracting,10 we show that first-best cooperative investments can also be achieved for the
more common agreements where parties stipulate intermediate quality levels.
3 The model
A buyer and a seller potentially trade a good. Both parties are risk neutral. In the first
period, the seller makes a relationship-specific cooperative investment, h 5 R+0 . The buyer’s
benefit from trade, y, is a random variable stochastically determined by the amount of the
seller’s investment, h, measured in money terms. The scrap or resale value of the good to
(1999) continues to apply if parties contract arround implicit warranties without replacing them with "express
warranties". Moreover, in labour contracts, stipulating a required quality level might not be possible as a
matter of law.
8Stremitzer (2008b) also shows that an optional regime combining specific performance and restitution
can induce first-best cooperative investments.
9See Edlin (1996). A real world example of such Cadillac contracts would be the contracts oered by
moving companies. They usually promise to deliver all their client’s belongings to his new residence intact.
This is as valuable as the company’s performance can be, as most of the time, the company falls short of its
promise and will have to compensate its client.
10Other papers exploiting the optional structure of real world remedy regimes are Priest (1978), Avraham
and Liu (2006), Brooks (2006) and Stremitzer (2008a).
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Figure 1: Timeline.
the seller is 0.11 The cost of the seller’s performance is deterministic and equal to a known
constant, f A 0. That is, the seller’s investment is cooperative, and there are no selfish
investments. This setting is identical to the setting studied in Che and Chung (1999).
The timing of the model, depicted in Figure 1, is as follows: At date 0, the buyer and
the seller sign a contract. The contract specifies a fixed price s to be paid by the buyer
upon performance as stipulated in the contract. It also specifies a quality level y¯ and a lump
sum payment w made by the buyer to the seller. At date 1, the seller makes a cooperative
investment: h  0. At date 2, the buyer’s benefit from the seller’s performance, y, is
drawn from [0> yk] by the distribution function I (· |h).12 The seller’s cost of performance is
deterministic and equal to f, where 0  f ? yk. At date 3, the parties play a breach game,
in which they announce their willingness to deliver or accept the good and choose among
the available breach remedies. This game will be explained in more detail below.
We assume that renegotiation has no associated costs and can occur at any time after
date 3 and before the seller actually performs at date 4. The parties split the surplus from
renegotiation at an exogenously given fixed ratio, with the seller receiving a share  5 [0> 1].13
Under this assumption, the buyer’s choice of legal remedy can be reversed whenever reversing
it is mutually beneficial for both parties.
As we consider an optional legal regime which gives the victim of breach the option to
11Consequently there cannot be a threat point eect like in Edlin and Hermalin (2000).
12This means parties have to live with the y which is realized at this stage: namely, cure will not be
an option should the good turn out to be non-conforming, y ? y¯, and therefore specific performance is
unavailalble in this case.
13The same ex-post bargaining setup was used by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996).
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choose between expectation damages and restitution we make the following informational
assumptions: In order to calculate expectation damages, the court must be able to observe
the buyer’s valuation and the seller’s variable cost. For restitution, it must be observable
whether the buyer’s benefit from performance lies below or above a certain threshold level
y¯. The seller’s choice of investment may be private information. Everything else, however,
is observable by the parties. The following technical assumptions are made throughout:
Assumption 1 I (· |·) is twice continuously dierentiable.
Assumption 2 Ih (· |h) ? 0 and Ihh (· |h) A 0 for all y in (0> yk) and for all h  0.
Assumption 3 Ih (y |0) = 4 and Ih (y |4) = 0 for all y in (0> yk).
Assumption 2 means that an increase in h moves the distribution in the sense of the
first-order stochastic dominance at a decreasing rate, while Assumption 3 ensures an interior
solution.
4 Benchmark
As a benchmark, we consider the first-best outcome. It has two components: (i) the e!cient
trade decision has trade occur if and only if y  f, and (ii) the e!cient investment level h0,
maximizes the net expected gains from trade, conditional on the e!cient trade decision:
h0 5 argmaxh Z (h)  argmaxh
Z yk
f
(y  f) Iy (y |h) gy  h= (1)
Integrating (1) by parts, the e!cient investment level, h0, is characterized by the following
first-order condition:
Z 0 (h0) = 
Z yk
f
Ih (y |h0 ) gy  1 = 0= (2)
If parties do not contract but simply bargain at date 3, they will split the gains of trade
according to their respective bargaining power. The seller’s expected payo will then be:
Xq(h)  
Z yk
f
(y  f) Iy (y |h) gy  h= (3)
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Integrating by parts and dierentiating, we can write the first-order condition for the
seller’s optimal investment decision hq:
X 0q(hq)  
Z yk
f
Ih (y |hq ) gy  1 = 0= (4)
As Ih (y |·) ? 0 and Ihh (y |·) A 0> it can be seen that the seller underinvests: hq ? h0.
By Assumptions 2 and 3, both h0 and hq are unique, finite, and strictly positive.
5 Legal Regime
We consider an optional legal regime where, in the case of nonperformance or nonconforming
performance, the promisee has a choice between disa!rming the contract with the remedy
of rescission and restitution or a!rming the contract and seeking expectation damages or
specific performance.
We now describe the breach game induced by this regime (hereafter referred to as the
on/o-contract-remedy regime). After realization of the buyer’s value at date 2, the seller can
either announce his intention to deliver or not (Figure 2). If the seller refuses to deliver (G¯),
the buyer can choose to disa!rm the contract ¡D¯¢ with the rescission and restitution remedy
(UU) or a!rm the contract (D) and receive expectation damages (HG) = Additionally, we
assume that the buyer can always prevent opportunistic breach by the seller by compelling
deliver of the good, which in a slight abuse of terminology we label specific performance
(VS ).14 If the buyer chooses to compel the seller’s delivery using specific performance,
14Our usage of "specific performance" here should be interpreted as forcing the seller to deliver the good
as realized, not as contracted for by the parties. We allow the buyer to compel deliver in order to rule
out opportunistic breaches by the seller. For example, imagine that Strict Corp., the trailer manufacturer,
develops a trailor which is much better than required under the contract, y AA y¯. By breaching the contract,
it only has to pay damages of y¯  s. This may be less than the seller’s share in the renegotiation surplus
which is  (y  f). Given that the good is relationship specific, it is obvious that the seller does not breach
the contract because he has found another buyer with higher valuation. The seller’s only objective can be
to extract additional surplus from the buyer in renegotiation. Courts are, however, reluctant to lend their
hand to a party which breaches strategically in order to increase its bargaining leverage. See Nothern Ind.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 279-80 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Richard Posner
(2003), pp. 118/119 and Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Tentative Draft No. 6,
American Law Institute, Andrew Kull (reporter) (2008), §39.
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payos are:
V
¡
G¯> VS
¢
= s f+ [f y]+ and (5)
E
¡
G¯> VS
¢
= y  s+ (1 ) [f y]+=
We assume throughout that parties will renegotiate towards the e!cient ex-post trade
decision. As, under specific performance, the court orders the good to be traded, parties only
need to renegotiate if f A y. When the buyer chooses expectation damages, renegotiations
will only occur for y A f and payos are:
V
¡
G¯> HG
¢
= [y¯  s]+ +  [y  f]+ and (6)
E
¡
G¯> HG
¢
= [y¯  s]+ + (1 ) [y  f]+ =
We allow the buyer to disa!rm ¡D¯¢ the contract with the rescission and restitution
remedy if the seller refuses to deliver (G¯), but observe that this remedy is dominated by
expectation damages as [y  s]+  0 and will therefore never be chosen by the buyer in
equilibrium.
In the case where the seller announces delivery (G), the buyer declares whether he intends
to a!rm or disa!rm. If he a!rms (D), the good is traded. The seller incurs production
cost f and receives price s but has to compensate the buyer for the non-conformity, y¯  y.
Payos will be:
V (G> D) = s f [y¯  y]+ +  [f y]+ and (7)
E (G> D) = y  s+ [y¯  y]+ + (1 ) [f y]+=
If the buyer chooses to disa!rm and reject the seller’s tender ¡D¯¢, legal consequences
dier depending on whether the tendered good was conforming to the contract (l) or not
(ll).
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Figure 2: Subgame induced by the on/o-contract-remedy regime.
(i) Conforming tender v  v¯. If the buyer rejects a conforming tender, the seller can
recover damages of [s f]+. Payos will be:
V
¡
G> D¯
¢
= [s f]+ + [y  f]+ and (8)
E
¡
G> D¯
¢
= [s f]+ + (1 ) [y  f]+=
As we will later show, our e!ciency results do not require that both the quality threshold
and the price be set below variable cost. Henceforth, we will therefore rule out the case
where y¯ ? f a s ? f.15 This allows us to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If the good is conforming to the contract, y  y¯, the seller will realize equilibrium
payo s f.
Proof. Appendix A1.
(ii) Non-conforming tender y ? y¯. If the tender is non-conforming to the contract, the
buyer does not become liable for rejecting delivery. On the contrary, the buyer has the legal
right to rescind the contract and to ask for restitution. He can recover any progress payment
that he might have made to the seller. Therefore, the parties’ payos are confined to their
15Ruling out this case saves us tedious case distinctions.
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share in the renegotiation surplus:
V
¡
G> D¯
¢
= [y  f]+ and (9)
E
¡
G> D¯
¢
= (1 ) [y  f]+=
Solving the subgame, given that the seller has announced not to deliver (G¯), we can
prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If the good is non-conforming, y ? y¯, it will never be optimal for the buyer to
choose specific performance.
Proof. Appendix A2.
We now look at the subgame, given that the seller announces delivery (G), and find that
it can only be optimal for the buyer to a!rm (D) if:
y¯  s+ (1 ) [f y]+  (1 ) [y  f]+ = (10)
Rearranging this condition, it can be written as:
y  y¯  s
1  + f  yˆ (11)
which is very intuitive, as the buyer is more likely to disa!rm the contract and renego-
tiate if the renegotiation surplus is high (high y), and if he can expect a big share in the
renegotiation surplus (low ). We can now prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3 If the good is non-conforming to the contract, y ? y¯, the following holds for the
seller’s equilibrium payo: 1) If s ? y¯, the seller’s payo will be  (y¯  s) for 0  y  f,
s f (y¯  y) for f ? y ? yˆ> and  (y  f) for y A yˆ. 2) If s  y¯, his payo will be 0 for 0
 y  f, and  (y  f) for y A f.
Proof. Appendix A3.
Figure 3 summarizes Lemmas 1-3.16 We can now prove the following proposition:
16Note that we do not wish to imply by Figure 3 that intervals are always non-empty.
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Figure 3: Seller’s equilibrium payos under on/o-contract remedy regime..
Proposition 1 Consider a regime, which, if performance is nonconforming (y ? y¯), allows
the buyer to choose between (i) a!rmation with the expectation damages remedy or (ii)
disa!rmation followed by rescission and restitution. In the case of nonperformance, the
buyer can choose among (i) specific performance, (ii) expectation damages or (iii) rescission
and restitution. Then, for any threshold value y¯ 5 (0> yk], there exists a price sˆ which induces
first-best cooperative investments.
Proof. The proof comes in two parts. (i) First, we show that the first best can be
achieved if the threshold is set below or at variable cost, y¯  f. (ii) Then, we show that this
is also true for y¯ A f.17
(i) Suppose that y¯  f. Further assume that the optimal price, sˆ, will exceed variable
cost:
sˆ A f= (12)
Then, by y¯  f it follows that sˆ A y¯, such that the seller’s payo will be 0 for all y 5 (0> y¯)
and s f for y  y¯. Therefore, the seller’s expected payo is:
X(h> s)  (s f) (1 I (y¯ |h)) h= (13)
Taking partial derivatives with respect to h we get:
X 0(h> s)   (s f)Ih (y¯ |h) 1= (14)
17Note that we will not assume y¯ ? f a s  f in any part of the proof, so that the equilibrium payos
represented in Figure 3 apply throughout. Also note that the results do not change if we assume that the
buyer moves first to announce his intention to reject the good.
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It follows from Assumption 2 that X 0(h0> s = f) = 1 ? 0 and X 0(h0> s)$4 A 0 for s$4,
where h0 is the first-best investment decision. As X 0(h0> s) is continuous in s, it follows by
the intermediate value theorem that there exists a sˆ 5 (f>4) such that X 0(h0> sˆ) = 0. It
follows from sˆ A f and Assumption 2 that
X 00(h> sˆ)   (sˆ f)Ihh (y¯ |h) ? 0. (15)
Hence, h0 is a global maximizer of the seller’s expected payo function X(h> sˆ). Note that
assumption (12) is satisfied for s = sˆ. Also remember our claim above that we will never
assume y¯ ? f a s ? f in order to derive our e!ciency results.
ii) Now, suppose that the quality threshold is above variable cost, y¯ A f. Then, for
f ? y ? y¯ we know from expression (11) that the buyer will choose termination followed by
restitution if:
y A yˆ (s)  y¯  s
1  + f= (16)
We distinguish three cases: a) yˆ (s) ? f, b) f  yˆ (s)  y¯ and c) yˆ (s) A y¯. (see Figure 4).
0 c v hv
a) b) c)
 pvˆ
Figure 4: Termination cut-os for dierent prices.
We shall now proceed in two steps. (1) First, we show for which parameter constellations
the first best can be achieved by setting a price consistent with case (a). (2) Then, we will
show that for all parameter constellations, for which the first best cannot be achieved under
case (a), it is possible to induce the first best by setting a price consistent with case (b).
(1) Case (a) is characterized by yˆ (s) ? f +, s A y¯. Hence, it follows from Lemmas 3
and 1 that the seller’s expected payo is:
Xd (h> s)  
Z y¯
f
(y  f) Iy (y |h) gy +
Z yk
y¯
(s f) Iy (y |h) gy  h= (17)
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Integrating by parts and dierentiating with respect to h gives us:
X 0d (h> s) = 
Z y¯
f
Ih (y |h) gy  1 + [sO  s]Ih (y¯ |h) (18)
where sO  y¯+(1 ) f is the lowest price for which termination can occur in equilibrium
(yˆ (sO) = y¯). It follows from the first-order condition for the social optimum (2) that
X 0d (h0> sO) ? 0. As X 0d (h0> s)$4 for s$4, and X 0d (h0> s) is continuous in s, it follows by
the intermediate value theorem that there exists a s¯ 5 (sO>4) such that X 0d (h0> s¯) = 0. It
is easy to see that X 00d (·> s) ? 0 for all s¯ 5 (sO>4), such that h0 is a global maximizer of the
seller’s expected payo function Xd (h> s¯). Yet, it follows from the characterization of case
(a) that s¯ A y¯. Hence, if s¯ 5 (sO> y¯], the lowest possible price under case (a) will lead to
overinvestment. (Note that y¯ A f implies that the interval is non-empty).
(2) We will now show that for all parameter constellations for which s¯ 5 (sO> y¯], there
exists a s0 such that it is possible to induce the first best under case (b). Case (b) is
characterized by:
s 5 [sO> y¯] +, yˆ (s) 5 [yˆ (y¯) = f> yˆ (sO) = y¯] = (19)
As s ? y¯ it follows from Lemmas 3 and 1 that the seller’s expected payo can be written as:
Xe (h> s)  
Z f
0
(y¯  s) Iy (y |h) gy +
Z yˆ
f
s f (y¯  y) Iy (y |h) gy (20)
+
Z y¯
yˆ
(y  f) Iy (y |h) gy +
Z yk
y¯
(s f) Iy (y |h) gy  h=
Integrating by parts, dierentiating with respect to h and inserting h = h0 gives us:
X 0e (h0> s)  [sO  s]Ih (y¯ |h0 )
Z yˆ
f
Ih (y |h0 ) gy  
Z y¯
yˆ
Ih (y |h0 ) gy  1= (21)
As, by definition, X 0d (h0> s¯) = 0, it follows from expression (18) that we can write:
[sO  s¯]Ih (y¯ |h0 ) = 
Z y¯
f
Ih (y |h0 ) gy + 1= (22)
This can be rewritten as:
[sO  s]Ih (y¯ |h0 ) = 
Z y¯
f
Ih (y |h0 ) gy + 1 (s s¯)Ih (y¯ |h0 ) = (23)
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Inserting (23) into (21) we get:
X 0e (h0> s) =  (s s¯)Ih (y¯ |h0 ) (1 )
Z yˆ
f
Ih (y |h0 ) gy= (24)
We will now show that there exists a sW 5 [sO> y¯] such that X 0e (h0> sW) = 0. Observing that
s = sO implies yˆ = y¯ (see 19) and inserting into (21) gives us:
X 0e (h0> sO) = 
Z y¯
f
Ih (y |h0 ) gy  1 (25)
which is non-positive by benchmark condition (2). Observing that s = y¯ implies yˆ = f (see
19) and inserting s = y¯ into (24) gives us:
X 0e (h0> s = y¯) = Ih (y¯ |h0 ) (y¯  s¯) (26)
which is positive as s¯ 5 (sO> y¯). Then, as X 0e (h0> s) is continuous in s, it follows by the
intermediate value theorem, that there must exist a sW 5 [sO> y¯) for which X 0e (h0> sW) = 0.
The investment decision h0 is a global maximum of the seller’s expected payo function if:
X 00e (h> sW) = [sO  sW]Ihh (y¯ |h)
Z yˆ(sW)
f
Ihh (y |h) gy  
Z y¯
yˆ(sW)
Ihh (y |h) gy ? 0= (27)
As yˆ (sW) 5 (f> y¯] for all sW 5 [sO> y¯), the last two terms are negative. As sW  sO the first
term must be non-positive. Hence, the function is concave for all sW 5 (sO> y¯).
The intuition for the result is the following: (i) For low-quality thresholds, y¯  f, the
seller’s payo is s  f if the value exceeds the threshold and 0 otherwise. Hence, the at-
tractiveness of producing high quality increases in the price. As the seller can increase the
probability of high quality by increasing investments, it is possible to use the price to ad-
just the seller’s investment incentives to the e!cient level. A similar balancing argument is
behind the result for high quality thresholds, y¯ A f. However, as an additional complica-
tion, we have to take into account that the seller’s payo depends on the buyer’s choice of
breach remedies, which in turn depends on the contract price. If price is set above a certain
threshold, the buyer will always terminate. For such prices, however, we can show that the
balancing argument does not always work and overinvestment will occur for some parameter
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constellations. Fortunately, for these particular parameter constellations, parties can still
achieve the first best by setting a lower price for which expectation damages is preferred to
termination.
Finally, it is possible to make the on/o-remedy-regime degenerate into a pure ‘expec-
tation damages’ regime by setting y¯  yk. We can derive the following proposition which
restates the result by Stremitzer (2008b):
Proposition 2 It is possible to induce the first best by setting a price s ? sO and threshold
y¯  yk (Cadillac contract).
Proof. Case (c) is characterized by
yˆ (s) A y¯ +, s ? sO (28)
If yˆ (s) A y¯, it follows from Lemmas 3 and 1 that the seller’s expected payo can be written
as:
Xf (h)  
Z f
0
(y¯  s) Iy (y |h) gy +
Z y¯
f
s f (y¯  y) Iy (y |h) gy (29)
+
Z yk
y¯
(s f) Iy (y |h) gy  h=
Integrating by parts and dierentiating, we can write the first-order condition for the seller’s
optimal investment decision, hf:
X 0f (hf) = 
Z y¯
f
Ih (y |hf ) gy  1 = 0= (30)
It can be seen that, by setting y¯  yk> the first best, hf = h0, is achieved in equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
Contractual parties who are dissatisfied with a counterparty’s performance or its absence
may pursue, at a most basic level, two alternative remedial routes. They can a!rm the
existing agreement and seek a remedy “on the contract” or they can disa!rm the agree-
ment and go after a remedy “o the contract”. Contemporary contract scholars, with some
notable exceptions,18 have focused almost exclusively on the former route, analyzing various
18See e.g.,Kull (1993), Basedow (2005).
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e!ciency properties of on-contract remedies like specific performance, expectation damages
and reliance damages. The o-contract remedy of rescission and restitution has largely been
ignored in the contract literature. Though academics have failed to pay adequate attention
to the distinction between a!rming and disa!rming a contract in pursuit of remedies, the
dierence is broadly recognized in common law and civil law practice and dates back to Ro-
man law.19 We consider the eect of allowing an aggrieved promisee to pursue either of the
two basic remedial options available in practice. We demonstrate that in this more realistic
remedial environment, as compared to what is typically assumed, parties are able to write
simple contracts that induce first-best cooperative investments.
19See Kull (2006) for a thoughtful discussion of the history behind the academic blindness to the distinction
in the American common law over the past century.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A1: Proof of Lemma 1
In order to proof Lemma 1, which states the seller’s equilibrium payos for the case that
y  y¯, we distinguish seven dierent cases, which cover all possible parameter constellations
except for y¯ ? f a s ? f.
(1) If v A c a p  c. (a) In the subgame where the seller has chosen G, the buyer accepts
in equilibrium if E (G>D) A E
¡
G> D¯
¢
which holds for y s   (s f) + (1 ) (y  f).
This can be rearranged to: y  f  (1 ) (y  f) which is true for all y A f.
(b) In the subgame where the seller has chosen G¯, the buyer chooses ED if E
¡
G¯> HG
¢
A
E
¡
G¯> VS
¢
. Given that this condition holds and using E (G>D) = E
¡
G¯> VS
¢
we get:
V(G>D) =Z E (G>D) =Z E
¡
G¯> VS
¢
A Z E
¡
G¯> HG
¢
= V
¡
G¯> HG
¢
(31)
Hence, given that E
¡
G¯> HG
¢
A E
¡
G¯> VS
¢
, the seller oers delivery and the buyer ac-
cepts. The seller’s equilibrium payo will be s  f. If E
¡
G¯> HG
¢
? E
¡
G¯> VS
¢
, it is
optimal for the buyer to choose SP. But then, the seller is indierent between choosing to
deliver or not, as V(G>D) = V(G¯> VS ) and the payo in equilibrium will be s  f. It is
easy to see that the same holds true for E
¡
G¯> HG
¢
= E
¡
G¯> VS
¢
.
(2) If v A c a p ? c. In the subgame where the seller has chosen G, the buyer accepts in
equilibrium if E (G>D) A E
¡
G> D¯
¢
which is true because y  s A y  f  (1 ) (y  f)
for all y A f a s ? f. By exactly the same argument as in part (b) of Case (1) we can
conclude that the seller’s payo in equilibrium will be s f.
(3) If v ? c a p  c. In the subgame where the seller has chosen G, we can see that
V (G>D) = s f+ (f y) A s f = V
¡
G> D¯
¢
for all y ? f. It follows that E (G>D) ?
E
¡
G> D¯
¢
. Hence, it is optimal for the buyer to reject delivery. In the subgame where the
seller has chosen G¯, we can see that V
¡
G¯> VS
¢
= s f +  (f y) A 0 = V
¡
G¯> HG
¢
as
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y¯  y ? f  s. If follows that E
¡
G¯> VS
¢
? E
¡
G¯> HG
¢
implying that the buyer chooses
ED. As V
¡
G> D¯
¢
= s f A 0 = V
¡
G¯> HG
¢
, the seller oers delivery and the buyer rejects
in equilibrium. The seller’s equilibrium payo will be s f.
(4) If v = c a p A c. If the seller choosesG, his payo will be sf irrespective of what the
buyer does. If the seller chooses G¯, it is optimal for the buyer to choose HG if E
¡
G¯> HG
¢
A
E
¡
G¯> VS
¢
+, 0 A y  s which is true as we assumed y = f ? s. Yet, this implies
V
¡
G¯> HG
¢
? V
¡
G¯> VS
¢
= s f = V (G> ·). Hence, the seller chooses G in equilibrium
and gets an equilibrium payo of s f.
(5) If v = c a p = c. If y = f a s = f it is easy to see that the seller’s payo will be
0 = s f, irrespective of what either party does.
(6) If v = c a p ? c. Given that the seller has chosen G, it is optimal for the buyer to
choose D if E (G>D) A E
¡
G> D¯
¢
+, y  s A 0 which is always true as we assumed
y = f A s. If the seller has chosen G¯, it is optimal for the buyer to choose VS ifE
¡
G¯> VS
¢

E
¡
G¯> HG
¢
+, ys  [y¯  s]+ which is true as ys A 0 and ys  y¯s. The seller’s
equilibrium payo will therefore be V (G>D) = V
¡
G¯> VS
¢
= s f irrespective of what he
does.
(7) If v ? c a p ? c. As y ? f a s ? f implies y¯ ? f a s ? f for y  y¯, this case is beyond
the scope of the lemma and does not have to be further considered.
7.2 Appendix A2: Proof of Lemma 2.
Given that the seller has chosen G¯, the seller will only choose VS if
y  s+ (1 ) [f y]+  [y¯  s]+ + (1 ) [y  f]+= (32)
Rearranging gives us:
y  s  [y¯  s]+ + (1 ) (y  f)= (33)
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a) As y ? y¯ this will never be satisfied for y A f. b1) If y  fas  y¯, the buyer will choose
VS if y s  (1 ) (y f). Rearranging and using y  f gives us: s ? y+(1 ) f  f.
Yet, s ? f can only hold for y¯ ? f. (Suppose the opposite: y¯  f. Then s  y¯ implies
s  f which contradicts the condition.) Therefore, VS will never be chosen by the buyer
if we rule out y¯ ? f a s ? f. b2) If y  fa s ? y¯, condition (33) can be rewritten as:
ys A y¯s+(1 ) (yf). Rearranging and using y  f gives us: y¯ ? y+(1 ) f  f.
Hence, VS will never be chosen by the buyer if we rule out y¯ ? f a s ? f.
7.3 Appendix A3: Proof of Lemma 3.
1) If s ? y¯ it can be seen that f ? yˆ. a) If y 5 [0> f] and given that the seller has chosen G,
the buyer will choose D as y  f ? yˆ. Making use of the result of Lemma 2 that we do not
have to bother about the possibility of the buyer choosing specific performance, it is then
optimal for the seller to choose G¯, whenever V (G>D) ? V
¡
G¯> HG
¢
. This is true as
s f (y¯  y) +  (f y) =  (y¯  s) (1 ) (f y) ?  (y¯  s) (34)
for all y ? f. For y = f, he is indierent between choosing G and G¯. In either case, the
seller’s equilibrium payo will be  (y¯  s). bi) If y A f, and given that the seller has chosen
G, it is optimal for the buyer to choose D if y 5 (f> yˆ]. Then, it is optimal for the seller to
choose G, whenever V (G>D) A V
¡
G¯> HG
¢
. This is true as
s f (y¯  y) =  (y¯  s) + y  f A  (y¯  s) +  (y  f) (35)
for all y A f. bii) If y 5 (yˆ>4) it is optimal for the buyer to choose D¯. The seller then chooses
G, whenever V
¡
G> D¯
¢
A V
¡
G¯> HG
¢
which is true for all s ? y¯. Hence, in equilibrium
the seller always announces delivery and the buyer accepts for y 5 [f> yˆ] and rejects for
y 5 (yˆ>4]. The seller’s equilibrium payo will be s f (y¯  y) and  (y  f) respectively.
(2) If s  y¯ it can be seen that yˆ ? f. a) If y 5 [0> yˆ] and given that the seller has chosen
G, the buyer will choose D. Using E (G>D) A E(G> D¯) and observing that s  y¯ and
y ? f we can write:
V (G>D) =Z E (G>D) ? Z E
¡
G> D¯
¢
= 0 = V
¡
G¯> HG
¢
. (36)
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Hence, it is optimal for the seller to choose G¯ and his equilibrium payo will be 0. b) If
y 5 (yˆ> f) and given that the seller has chosen G, the buyer will choose D¯. Then, the seller
will be indierent between choosing G and G¯ as V
¡
G> D¯
¢
= V
¡
G¯> HG
¢
= 0. The seller’s
equilibrium payo will be 0. c) If y 5 [f>4) and given that the seller has chosenG, the buyer
will always choose D¯ in equilibrium. As V
¡
G> D¯
¢
= V
¡
G¯> HG
¢
the seller is indierent
between choosing G and G¯. Either way his equilibrium payo will be  (y  f).
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